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COMMENT
PAY TELEVISION PIRACY: DOES SECTION 605 OF THE
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
PROHIBIT SIGNAL PIRACY-AND
SHOULD IT?
[Movie Systems v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983)].
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty years, the telecommunications industry has bene-
fited the public by developing new alternatives to public television, (free
TV). The growth of over-the-air pay television2 (pay TV) has been the
most dramatic of these new alternatives.3 The industry's success, how-
ever, is currently threatened by vendors who sell equipment capable of
"pirating"4 pay TV transmissions.5 Attempts to sell the equipment have
1. Recent developments include multipoint distribution service (MDS), subscription
television (STV), direct broadcast system (DBS), and low power television (LPTV). See
Meyer, Telecommunications: A Scorecard of the ew Technologies and Players, in 1983 EN-
TERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 121-56 (1983). See generally Ham-
ilton, Implicationsfor Economic Regulation of Cable Television, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433
(1984).
2. Over-the-air pay TV signals are transmitted through the airwaves, not through
cable. See generallyIn re Amendment of Part 3 of the Comm'n Rules & Reg. (Radio Broad-
cast Serv.) to Provide for Subscription Telev. Serv., 23 F.C.C. 532 (1957) (three-year trial
period approved for over-the-air subscription television systems) [hereinafter cited as First
Report and Order]. For a discussion of specific over-the-air systems, see infra notes 16-25 and
accompanying text.
3. Pay TV's popularity is due mainly to pay TV companies' ability to quickly set up
operations and commence business. Unlike cable television, over-the-air pay TV does not
require burdensome initial outlays of time and capital. See Bienstock, Theft ofservice ofover-
the-air pay TV Are the airwavesfee?, 56 FLA. B.J. 240, 240 (1982). Laying underground or
aboveground cable is a time-consuming and expensive process. See Wonnetka's Pay TVBo-
nanga, Bus. WK., Sept. 3, 1979, at 138.
4. This Comment defines pirating as the unauthorized reception of pay TV signals.
People receiving these signals without permission are termed "pirates."
5. See National Subscription Telev. v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981) (man-
ufacturer and seller); Chartwell Communication Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th
Cir. 1980) (seller); Hoosier Home Theater, Inc. v. Precision TV & Antenna, No. IP-82-
1140-C (S.D. Ind. June 15, 1982) (order granting permanent injunction) (manufacturer
and seller); Movie Sys. v. Communications Center, No. 4-82-661 (D. Minn. June II, 1982)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (seller); Movie Sys. v. MWH Enter., No. 82-C-321
(E.D. Wis. June 10, 1982) (order granting preliminary injunction) (seller); American
Telev. & Communications Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 617 (D. Colo.
1982) (seller); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Ashton E!ec. Ltd., No. 81-CV-3307, slip op.
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1981) (seller); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Tech.,
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been curtailed by court decisions consistently holding these vendors in
violation of section 605 of the Communications Act of 19346 (the Act).
Nevertheless, many companies continue to advertise and sell equipment
to consumers. 7 Consequently, the pay TV industry remains threatened
by pirates who purchase or have purchased equipment from these
No. 81 Civ. 559, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1981) (manufacturer and seller); American
Home Theater, Inc. v. Aries Mktg., No. 81-0657A (D. Utah Sept. 25, 1981) (order grant-
ing permanent injunction) (seller); American Telev. & Communications Corp. v. Pirate
T.V., Inc., No. 81-969-CIV-EBD, slip op. (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1981) (manufacturer and
seller); Satellite Telev. & Assoc. Resources, Inc. v. Portsmouth T.V. Serv., No. 81-737-N
(E.D. Va. July 31, 1981) (order granting temporary injunction) (seller); Louisville Sub-
scription Telev. v. J & L Elec., Inc., No. C 81-0274 L(A), slip op. (W.D. Ky. May 27, 1981)
(seller); Oak Indus. v. Sampson, No. CIV 80-420 PHX VAC (D. Ariz. July 10, 1980) (or-
der granting preliminary injunction) (manufacturer and seller); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
Pay TV, 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (temporary injunction against pay TV com-
pany retransmitting pirated programming); Tele-Features, Inc. v. Heller, No. C-385135
(Super. Ct. Ariz. Maricopa County Oct. 26, 1979) (judgment granting permanent injunc-
tion) (manufacturer and seller); California Satellite Sys. v. Nichols, No. 294843 (Super. Ct.
Cal. Sacramento County May 12, 1981) (notice of ruling on preliminary injunction)
(manufacturer and seller); Tekkom, Inc. v. Dietrich, No. A-202050, slip op. (Nev. Dist. Ct.
Clark County June 2, 1981) (seller); see also United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.
Tex. 1982) (criminal action under section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
against seller); KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 42 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Unauthorized Interception and Use of Multi-
point Distribution Service (MDS) Transmissions, FCC Public Notice No. 11850 (Jan. 24,
1979) [hereinafter cited as FCC Public Notice]. See generally United States v. Westbrook,
502 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Bienstock, supra note 3, at 240; Connor, MDS Televi-
sion in the Eighties. Video Cops and Video Robbers, 6 COM. & L. 45 (1984); Flint, Signal Recep-
tion and Piray, INT'L Bus. LAW., Oct. 1983, at 7 (international law and air-wave piracy);
Viera, The Demise of the Airwave Pirates, ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 38 (1982), in 1983 EN-
TERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 157 (1983); Comment, Subscription
Television: Should the Government Prohibit Unauthorized Reception?, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 291
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Subscription TV]; Note, Unauthorized Pay Television
Reception Under Section 605 of the Communications Act, 3 CoMM/ENT. L.J. 719 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Note, Unauthorized Pay TV]; Comment, Pay Television Legal Protection Against
Interception Backyard Earth Stations Amplify Current Imperfections, 87 DICK. L. REV. 95 (1982);
Note, Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations and Piracy of the Airwaves, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 84
(1982); Comment, Subscription Television Decoders. Can California Prohibit Their Manufacture and
Sale?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 839 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Television De-
coders]; Note, The Piracy of Subscription Television.- An Alternative to the Communications Law, 56
SO. CAL. L. REV. 935 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, An Alternative]; Comment, Decoding
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act: A Cause of Action for Unauthorized Reception of
Subscription Television, 50 U. CINN. L. REV. 362 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Decoding]; Casenote, National Subscription Television v. S & H TV: The Problems of Unau-
thorized Interception of Subscription Television-Are the Legal Airwaves Unscrambled?, 9 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 641 (1982); The Piracy Danger to Subscription TV, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1980,
at 44.
6. See infia note 67 (text of section 605). See generally 4 B. SCHWARTZ, THE Eco-
NOMIc REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2373-2546 (1973) (legislative history of
the Act and its predecessors); Note, Unauthorized Pay TV, supra note 5, at 739-43 (discussion
of legislative history).
7. See, e.g., National Subscription Telev. v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir.
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Although pirates have existed since the late 1960's, the August 1983
case of Movie Systems v. He/ler9 is the first published decision against a
pirate.1o In Heler, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the
application of section 60511 to individuals who receive unauthorized pay
TV transmissions.12
This Comment addresses the ramifications of the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in Heller. Through an analysis of section 605's statutory language,
history, and case law, the Comment suggests that the extension of section
605's application from manufacturers and sellers of pirating equipment
to individual pirates lacks support. Close examination of Heller reveals
imminent problems which militate against the decision effectively pro-
tecting the pay TV industry or the constitutional13 rights of citizens, es-
pecially their right to privacy. 14 This Comment concludes with a
recommendation that Congress mandate scrambling of pay TV signals
and strict regulation of the manufacture and sale of pirating equipment.
This approach appropriately balances the concerns of the pay TV indus-
try and the rights of citizens.
1981); American Telev. & Communications Corp. v. Pirate T.V., Inc., No. 81-969-CIV-
EBD, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1981); Connor, supra note 5, at 45.
Although air piracy presumably threatens the interests of the pay TV industry, sev-
eral courts have observed a contrary conclusion. These decisions reason that no economic
detriment is incurred because many pirates would elect against subscription if pirating
were prohibited. See American Telev. & Communications Corp. v. Pirate T.V., Inc., No.
81-969-CIV-EBD, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1981) ("[O]ne must deal in the area of
conjecture to try to determine whether purchasers of unauthorized equipment would
otherwise have been regular subscribers if the pirate market did not exist."); California
Satellite Sys. v. Nichols, No. 294843 (Super. Ct. Cal. Sacramento County May 12, 1981)
(notice of ruling on preliminary injunction) ("It would be virtually impossible to prove
that those who bought from [unauthorized antenna retailers] would necessarily have be-
come customers of plaintiff's service.").
8. See, e.g., RADIo-ELECTRONICS, March 1984, at 110, 121 (advertisements for pay
TV antennae); see also infra note 43.
9. No. 3-82-933, slip op. (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1982), aft'd, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983).
10. See Viera, supra note 5, at 166. But see Movie Sys. v. MWH Enter., No. 82-C-321
(E.D. Wis. June 10, 1982) (order granting preliminary injunction) (court examined only
company's unauthorized sale of pirating equipment notwithstanding defendant partner's
reception of unauthorized transmissions).
11. Section 605 addresses the issue of unauthorized publication or use of communica,
tions. See 47 U.S.C.S. § 605 (Law. Co-op. 1983); injra note 67 (text of section 605).
12. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 494-95.
13. Governmental attempts to enforce section 605 may constitute an illegal search
and seizure, thus violating both the fourth and fourteenth amendments. See inqfa notes
168-78 and accompanying text.
14. No constitutional infringement occurs when private parties enforce section 605.
See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (in the absence of state action, private
activities do not result in constitutional violations). Private enforcement of section 605,
however, may violate a right to privacy recognized under common law, see infba note 182
and accompanying text, or statutory law, see infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
1984]
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II. THE HELLER DECISION
The plaintiff, Movie Systems, Inc. (MSI), was a Home Box Office
(HBO) licensee 15 which transmitted HBO programming to customers
via multipoint distribution service 16 (MDS), one of three types of over-
the-air pay TV.17 Unlike free TV, MDS relies on paying subscribers
rather than commercial advertisers for financial support.' 8 MDS com-
panies raise revenue by charging subscribers monthly feesl 9 and selling
or leasing equipment necessary to receive MDS programming. 20 Sub-
scribers receive news, sporting events, movies and other special program-
ming.2 1 MDS programming is transmitted through high frequency
15. Home Box Office, Inc. (HBO) licensed pay TV programming services, including
motion pictures, sporting events, and special programming. See Hller, 710 F.2d at 493. In
1982, HBO granted MSI an exclusive license to distribute HBO programming in the
Twin Cities area. See id Previously, Twin Cities Home Theater (Twin Cities) had been
the exclusive HBO affiliate licensee in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Id. Twin Cities
failed to sue homeowners whom it knew were pirating its signal. See id at 495. Homeown-
ers were refused service and those inquiring about putting up their own equipment were
told that they could do so, without paying a subscriber fee. Memorandum in Opposition
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, Movie Sys. v. Heller, No. 3-82-933,
slip op. (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1982). After receiving its license, MSI sought to begin collect-
ing subscriber fees from homeowners. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 494.
16. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 493. See generally In re Amendments of Parts 1, 2, 21, 43 of
the Comm'n Rules & Reg. to Provide for Licensing & Reg. of Common Carrier Radio
Stations in the Multipoint Distrib. Serv., 45 F.C.C.2d 616 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Report and Order]; injfa notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
17. The other two types of over-the-air pay TV are STV and DBS. See supra note 1.
STV is similar to free TV. The STV signal is broadcast over a regular television station,
but encoded or scrambled so that it is intelligible only to paying subscribers. In re Amend-
ment of Part 73 of the Comm'n Rules & Reg. (Radio Broadcast Serv.) to Provide for
Subscription Telev. Serv., 15 F.C.C.2d 465 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Report and
Order]; First Report and Order, supra note 2; Bienstock, supra note 3, at 240; Comment, Sub-
scription TV, supra note 5, at 292-95; Note, An Alternative, supra note 5, at 935-37.
DBS is a system whereby programming is broadcast to homes from satellites orbiting
the earth. The FCC recently authorized DBS services on an experimental basis. See In re
Inquiry into the dev. of regulatory policy in regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites for the
period following the 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conf., 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982); see also
In re Application of Satellite Telev. Corp. for Authority to Construct an Experimental
Direct Broadcast Satellite Sys., 92 F.C.C.2d 1053 (1982) (granting license for first phase of
DBS).
18. See Note, Pay Television and Section 605 of the Commaunications Act of 1934: A Need For
Congressional Action, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1249 (1981) (citing FEDERAL COMMUNICA-
TIONS COMM'N, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, POLICIES FOR REGULATION OF DIRECT
BROADCAST SATELLITES 11 (1980)).
19. For example, plaintiff MSI charged a $19.95 per month subscription fee. See Ap-
peals court upholds ruhng HBO signal not fee for taking, Minneapolis Star & Trib., July 1, 1983,
at 1B, col. 1.
20. MDS transmissions may or may not be scrambled. Monthly fees vary depending
upon whether decoding equipment is needed and whether the equipment is purchased or
leased. See infra note 163.
21. See, e.g., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 682 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Fourth Report and Order, supra note 17, at 474.
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microwave signals which cannot be viewed on a regular television set
without special equipment. 22 A microwave antenna, 23 a down con-
verter,24 and a power supply are needed.
25
In April 1981, pro se defendant, Edward Heller III, purchased and in-
stalled reception equipment in his suburban Minneapolis home.26 Heller
used the equipment to receive MSI's MDS signal transmitted in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area. 27 After detecting his equipment,28 MSI con-
tacted Heller and demanded payment of the monthly subscription fee.
2 9
When Heller refused to subscribe,30 MSI filed suit against him asking the
federal district court to permanently enjoin Heller from receiving its pro-
gramming without paying the subscription fee.3 1 Heller counterclaimed,
alleging that MSI had violated his fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights and his right to privacy by monitoring the television viewing pref-
erences he made within the privacy of his home.3 2 Heller also claimed
22. The MDS programming is omni-directionally broadcast from MSI's local trans-
mitter into the airwaves. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 493. Anyone with the necessary equip-
ment living within the range of these signals can receive the programming. See infra notes
23-25 and accompanying text. Programming originates in non-local studios and is trans-
mitted through microwave links to "up-link stations." These stations relay the program-
ming via satellite to centrally located "down-link stations" across the country. See
Appellee's Brief and Appendix at 5-6, Movie Sys. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983).
These down-link receivers relay the programming through microwave links to local trans-
mitters such as MSI's. Id at 6.
23. Antennae receive microwave signals much like antennae for radio or television
sets.
24. A down converter reduces the microwave signal frequency to that of a regular
unused television channel. Eg., Heller, 710 F.2d at 493; Bienstock, supra note 3, at 240.
25. A power supply powers the entire receiving system. See Bienstock, supra note 3, at
240.
26. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 494.
27. The local transmitter, owned by Microband Corporation of America, is located
on the top of the Investors Diversified Services (IDS) tower in downtown Minneapolis. See
id at 493.
28. Although MSI may have observed Heller's antenna, evidence suggests that MSI
learned of Heller's pirating after monitoring his neighborhood with electronic detection
equipment. See First Affidavit ofJeffery Sutliff at 1, Appellee's Brief and Appendix, supra
note 22, at A.79; Dawson, Vanjull of electronic equipment sni# out ;pirate' TVantennas, Minne-
apolis Star & Trib., July 21, 1982, at IA, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as "Pirate' TVAntennas]; see
also Dawson, Battle starts over use of'illegal'antennas to catchfhiks at home, Minneapolis Star &
Trib., June 2, 1982, at 13A, col. I (public comments made by Heller about his pirating
activities) [hereinafter cited as 'I/legal' Antennas].
29. MSI threatened Heller with criminal prosecution for violating title 47, section 605
of the United States Code. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 495; 'Illegal' Antennas, supra note 28, at
13A, col. 1.
30. In addition to refusing to pay subscription fees, Heller publicly asserted a consti-
tutional right to receive any broadcast signal within the privacy of his own home. See
'Illegal' Antennas, supra note 28, at 13A, col. 1.
31. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 494; see also Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 1.
32. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 496; see also Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 4-5.
1984]
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the plaintiff had violated antitrust laws.33
After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the court dis-
missed Heller's counterclaims and motion and granted MSI's motion for
summary judgment.34 Heller was enjoined from receiving or conspiring
to receive plaintiff's communications without its authorization.3 5 On ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
3 6
MSI's action alleged that Heller violated section 605 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.37 Section 605 prohibits the unauthorized intercep-
tion or reception of any wire or radio communication that is divulged,
published, or beneficially used. 38 After noting Heller's admission that he
had received MSI's signals without paying the subscription fee, the dis-
trict court summarily held that a violation of section 605 had occurred.
3 9
Heller denied liability and contended that MSI's signals were ex-
cluded from the Act's protection by a proviso in section 605.40 The pro-
viso states that section 605 does not apply to radio signals transmitted for
use by the general public.41 Heller argued that because MSI's transmis-
sions were unscrambled 42 and could be received by equipment generally
33. Heller's antitrust claim concerning illegal tying is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. See Hler, 710 F.2d at 495; Heler, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 5-6. Heller claimed that
MSI was precluded from collecting subscriber fees from pirates informed by Twin Cities
that they could install their own equipment without charge. This claim was premised
upon the privity relationship between MSI and Twin Cities. See Hieller, 710 F.2d at 495;
Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 5-6; see also supra note 15 (discussing the relationship be-
tween MSI and Twin Cities).
34. See Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 6.
35. Id
36. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 496.
37. Id at 494. Section 605 provides individuals with a private cause of action for
injuries arising from a violation of that section. See, e.g., National Subscription Telev. v. S
& H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook,
637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947);
American Telev. & Communications Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 617
(D. Colo. 1982).
38. See inf/a note 67 (text of section 605).
39. Heler, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 3 n.3. The court's decision was summary because
the mere presence of an interception or a reception is not sufficient to violate section 605.
See inf/a notes 68-70 and accompanying text. In addition to reception or interception,
either divulgence, publication, or beneficial use must occur. See id By omitting discussion
of these requirements, the district and Eighth Circuit courts impliedly held that Heller's
reception and personal use of MSI's programming violated section 605. Such a holding
would be incorrect. See infa notes 92-107.
40. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 494.
41. The proviso in section 605 states:
[The statute] shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing or utilizing
the contents of any radio communication which is transmitted by any station for
the use of the general public, which relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons
in distress, or which is transmitted by an amateur station operator or by a citi-
zens band radio operator.
47 U.S.C.S. § 605 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); see inf/a note 67 (text of section 605).
42. MDS transmissions may be scrambled or unscrambled. See, e.g., Report and Order,
[Vol. I0
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available to the public, 4 3 they were broadcast for the use of the general
public and exempted from protection.44 The court rejected this argu-
ment stating that MSI's transmissions were intended exclusively for sub-
scriber use despite their accessibility to the general public.45
After declaring Heller in violation of section 605, the court examined
his counterclaims. Heller contended that MSI's monitoring of his televi-
sion viewing preferences violated his fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights, as well as privacy rights afforded him by state law.46 The court
dismissed Heller's constitutional claims, noting that the constitutional
prohibitions of the fourth and fourteenth amendments do not apply to
actions by private individuals.47 Finally, Heller's privacy claim was re-
jected because "Minnesota has never recognized, either by legislative or
court action, a cause of action for inx;asion of privacy, even though many
other states have done so."48 On appeal, Heller also claimed abridgment
of his first amendment right to the airwaves by the application of section
supra note 16, at 620-2 1; Bienstock, supra note 3, at 240. MSI's transmissions are unscram-
bled and may be received by any television with an antenna capable of receiving the
microwave frequency band. Subscribers of other pay TV companies receive scrambled
signals which must be unscrambled by a decoder in order to be intelligible.
43. Although local retailers have been successfully enjoined from selling pirating
equipment, similar equipment is readily available from wholesalers and mail order houses
in other states. See You Can Watch That Secret Movie Channel, 73 MAG. RADIO AMATEURS 32
(1979).
44. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 494; see also Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 3.
45. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 494; see also Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 3-4.
46. See Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 4-5; see also Heller, 710 F.2d at 496. Heller also
claimed that MSI's activities violated title 18, sections 241 and 242, and title 42, section
1983 of the United States Code. See Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 4-5. The district court
dismissed the former claim, noting that sections 241 and 242 are criminal statutes which
do not permit a civil cause of action. Id. at 5. The latter claim was rejected by the court
because Heller was unable to establish that there had been any action "under color of
state law." Id
47. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 496; Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 5.
48. Heller, 710 F.2d at 496 (citing Hendry v. Connor, 303 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d
921, 923 (1975) (per curiam). See generally Note, Tortious Inoasion of Privacy. Minnesota as a
Model, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163 (1978).
Because Minnesota has yet to recognize a common law right to privacy, Heller re-
quested that the circuit court certify his privacy claim as important and doubtful, permit-
ting review by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The court, however, declined to certify the
issue because it was "not without guidance from state courts on the issue and the case
[was] .. . primarily based on federal law." Heller, 710 F.2d at 496 n.9.
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the district court rejected Heller's privacy argument hold-
ing that Heller did not have "a protectible privacy interest in 'backwash' emitted by an
antenna placed in plain view atop his home." Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 5. "Back-
wash" is the electronic signal emitted by the oscillator in a television set or down-con-
verter. This signal may be monitored by electronic surveillance equipment. See Brief for
Appellant at 8, Movie Sys. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983); Connor, supra note 5, at
56; 'Pirate' TVAntennas, supra note 28, at 5A, col. 4. The district court's conclusion that
Heller had no privacy interest at stake was summary, and its apparent reliance on the
plain view doctrine is questionable. See infta notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
1984]
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605 to his activities.49 The Eighth Circuit declined to address the issue
because the first amendment claim was not raised in the district court. 50
With the exception of the first amendment argument, the Heller deci-
sion seems to have settled the legality of piracy. Future problems will
arise, however, when states or pay TV companies attempt to enforce sec-
tion 605 of the Act. First, as MSI has experienced, 5' enforcement will be
an expensive and time-consuming process.5 2 Pay TV companies in
many states will be reticent or unable to enforce their rights under sec-
tion 605; most states recognize a cause of action for the invasion of pri-
vacy, 53 and other states have enacted statutes that prohibit pay TV
companies from monitoring what people watch on television.54 Second,
the state will seldom be able to establish probable cause for conducting
electronic surveillance in search of pirates55 because microwave antennae
49. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 495 n.8; Brief for Appellant at 14-18.
50. See Heler, 710 F.2d at 445 n.8.
51. After the Heller decision, MSI filed 18 class action suits against the 1800 individu-
als known to be pirating MSI's signal. See Movie Sys. v. Abel, No. 3-83-621, slip op. (D.
Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Daniel, No. 3-83-645, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983);
Movie Sys. v. Busis, No. 3-83-644, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Befort,
No. 3-83-643, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Elwood, No. 3-83-646, slip
op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. German, No. 3-83-647, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept.
9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Hamm, No. 3-83-68, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys.
v. Houser, No. 3-83-651, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Kane, No. 3-83-
652, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Lambert, No. 3-83-653, slip op. (D.
Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. McLevish, No. 3-83-654, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9,
1983); Movie Sys. v. Muller, No. 3-83-655, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v.
Owcvarzak, No. 3-83-656, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Ramotar, No. 3-
83-670, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Schlief, No. 3-83-671, slip op. (D.
Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v. Speak, No. 3-83-672, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983);
Movie Sys. v. Tobiason, No. 3-83-673, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); Movie Sys. v.
Williams, No. 3-83-674, slip op. (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 1983); see also Dawson, Pay TVfm must
refie "irating' suits, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Sept. 10, 1983, at 12A, col. 2. The federal
district court in Minnesota non-suited MSI, forcing it to refile individual suits against all
but the first individual named in each suit.
52. See, e.g., Appellee's Brief and Appendix, supra note 22, at A. 105 (excerpt from
proceedings, American Home Theater, Inc. v. Aries Mktg., No. 81-657, at 8 (D. Utah
Sept. 15, 1981) (order granting permanent injunction) (expense of detecting pirates and
collecting subscription fees from pirates would be an impossible task)); American Telev. &
Communications Corp. v. Pirate T.V., Inc., No. 81-969-CIV-EBD, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 24, 1981) (plaintiff pay TV company has no feasible or cost efficient means of termi-
nating pirate activities); California Satellite Sys. v. Nichols, No. 294843, at 7-8 (Super. Ct.
Cal. Sacramento County May 12, 1981) (notice of ruling on preliminary injunction) (pro-
hibitively expensive to obtain admissible evidence needed to win judgment which conceiv-
ably cannot be satisfied); see also Dawson, supra note 51, at 12A, col. 2.
53. See Note, supra note 48, at 175 n.56.
54. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 87-1 to -3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 134.43 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
55. Knowledge of pirating activities may occur via informers, coerced public declara-
tions, see "llegal'Antennas, supra note 28, at 13A, col. 1 (disclosure prompted by threatened
litigation), or unsolicited public declarations. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967) (no reasonable expectation of privacy exists if one publicly exposes private informa-
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may be concealed.56 Since most pirates will hide their antennae, the
state would have to resort to indiscriminate electronic searches. This
would entail violations of the general public's fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights.
57
III. REGULATION OF THE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF MICROWAVE
ANTENNAE AND SECTION 605
Citizens are entitled to purchase, own, and protect personal prop-
erty.58 The right to own a microwave antenna capable of being used in
an illegal manner is not excluded.5 9 Ownership of microwave antennae is
not per se illegal6o because there are legitimate uses for this equipment.6 1
Notwithstanding the right to own microwave dishes, the state may reg-
ulate their use under its police power.6 2 Such regulation, however, can
only be justified by the presence of a valid public interest.63 The Federal
Communications Commission 64 (FCC) has stated that protection of pay
TV is in the public interest.65 Pay TV companies are more responsive to
subscribers' programming demands than free TV is to the preferences of
tion); see also infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (enforcement problems caused by
concealed antennae).
56. Microwaves can penetrate trees, houses, and other obstructions. See Affidavit of
Donald G. Kranz, at 2-3, Appellee's Brief and Appendix at A.76, Movie Sys. v. Heller, 710
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983).
57. See infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; see, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920),
rev'don other groundr, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
59. Cf United States v. Schweihs, 569 F.2d 965, 969 (5th Cir. 1978) (18 U.S.C.
§ 2512(l)(b) does not apply to production, distribution, and possession of electronic equip-
ment designed for use in nonsurreptitious activities even though equipment is capable of
being used in a surreptitious manner).
60. No state presently outlaws the mere possession of microwave antennae.
61. Alternative legitimate uses include amateur radio and educational television. See
Affidavit of Gary Smoliak at 4-5, Movie Sys. v. Communications Center, No. 4-82-661 (D.
Minn. June 8, 1982) (listing alternative legitimate uses for microwave antennae); see also
Movie Sys. v. Communications Center, No. 4-82-661 (D. Minn. June 22, 1982) (order
denying motion finding defendant in contempt); American Telev. & Communication
Corp. v. Pirate T.V., Inc., No. 81-969-CIV-EBD, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1981);
Tekkom, Inc. v. Dietrich, No. A-202050, slip op. at 3 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark County June 2,
1981); 47 U.S.C.S. § 605 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (proviso exempting amateur radio
from section 605's application).
62. Accord Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (state police power permits regu-
lation of milk prices to protect an affected public interest); Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97,
102 (1918) (state police power permits regulation of liquor traffic).
63. Accord Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapik, 57 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1952); New-
land v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 537, 254 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1953).
64. The FCC was established by the Federal Communications Act of 1934 and
charged with the regulation of interstate and foreign wire and radio transmissions. 47
U.S.C.S. §§ 151, 152(a) (Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1983).
65. See Fourth Report and Order, supra note 17, at 517.
19841
9
et al.: Pay Television Piracy: Does Section 605 of the Federal Communicat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the non-paying public. 66 Thus, pay TV's competition with free TV ben-
efits the public by increasing the diversity and quality of all television
programming.
The courts have safeguarded the public interest in the pay TV indus-
try by enjoining vendors of pirating equipment under section 605.67 Sec-
tion 605 is a criminal statute which sets forth a conjunctive test for
determining when an unauthorized use or publication of radio signals is
illegal.68 The first requirement is that an unauthorized person intercept,
receive, or assist other unauthorized persons in receiving communica-
66. Pay TV is supported only by subscribers. Movie Sys. v. MWH Enter., No. 82-C-
0321, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 1982); R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWAN, Eco-
NOMIc ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 135 (1978). Therefore, pay TV viewers
have more potential than commercial television viewers to influence television program-
ming. If a pay TV company did not provide a subscriber with the type of programming
he desired, he would either subscribe to a different pay TV service or terminate his pay
TV service altogether.
67. See supra note 5. Section 605 concerns the unauthorized publication or use of
communications:
Except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18, United States Code [18 USCS
§§ 2510 et seq.] no person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assist-
ing in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio
shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or recep-
tion, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, (2) to a
person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its destina-
tion, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicat-
ing centers over which the communication may be passed, (4) to the master of a
ship under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a subpena[sic] issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or (6) on demand of other lawful authority. No person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person. No person not being entitled
thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communica-
tion by radio and use such communication (or any information therein con-
tained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No
person having received any intercepted radio communication or having become
acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such communication was in-
tercepted, shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) or use such com-
munication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another not entitled thereto. This section shall not apply to the receiv-
ing, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication
which is transmitted by any station for the use of the general public, which re-
lates to ships in distress, or which is transmitted by an amateur radio station
operator or by a citizens band radio operator.
47 U.S.C.S. § 605 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (emphasis added) (brackets in original).
68. Id; see also United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 881 (1974); Reston v. FCC, 492 F. Supp. 697, 704 (D.D.C. 1980); Common Carrier
Ass'n for Telecommunications, 79 F.C.C.2d 273, 275 (1980) (section 605 provides that "no
person shall intercept and divulge or publish and no person shall receive or assist in receiv-
ing and use"); FCC Public Notice, supra note 5; Letter from FCC, 3700 (Apr. 22, 1981) (on
file at the William Mitchell Law Review office).
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tions.69 If the first requirement is met, a violation is established if the
unauthorized person also divulges, publishes, or beneficially uses the
communication. 70 A violation of section 605 is "punished by a fine of
not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two
years, or both."7I
Section 605 contains a proviso exempting any radio communication
transmitted for the use of the general public.72 Although the exact
meaning of the proviso is debatable, 73 most courts have held that un-
scrambled microwave transmissions do not fall within the exemption and
are protected by section 605.74 Those courts determined that vendors of
reception devices violated section 605 because their acts assisted third
parties in receiving unauthorized communications.
75
69. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
71. 47 U.S.C.S. § 501 (Law. Co-op. 1981).
72. Id § 605 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983). For the full text of the proviso in section 605,
see supra note 41.
73. One view holds that the nature of the programming and its mode of transmission
control, regardless of whether the transmission is intended for the public. See Functional
Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
The other view is that the intent of the sender controls. See Chartwell Communications
Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1980).
74. See Heller, 710 F.2d at 492; National Subscription Telev. v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d
820, 825 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Communications Corp. v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459,
466 (6th Cir. 1980); Movie Sys. v. MWH Enter., No. 82-C-0321, at 2-3 (E.D. Wis. June 10,
1982) (order granting preliminary injunction); American Telev. & Communication Corp.
v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 617, 619-21 (D. Colo. 1982); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. Ashton Elec. Ltd., No. 81-CV-3307, slip op. at 7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1981); Home
Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Tech., No. 81 Civ. 559, slip op. at 5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 1981); American Telev. & Communication Corp. v. Pirate T.V., Inc., No. 81-969-
CIV-EDB, slip op. at 6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1981); Louisville Subscription Telev. v. J & L
Elec., Inc., No. C81-0274 L(A), slip op. at 3 (W.D. Ky. May 27, 1981); California Satellite
Sys. v. Nichols, No. 294843, at 5-7 (Super. Ct. Cal. Sacramento County May 12, 1981)
(notice of ruling on preliminary injunction); United States v. Westbrook, 502 F. Supp.
588, 591 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Pay TV, 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); see also Comment, Unscrambling the Broadcasting Status of Over-the-Air Subscription Televi-
sion Under 17 US C § 605, 1982 B.Y.U.L. REV. 695; Note, supra note 6; Comment, Decod-
ing, supra note 5; Note, supra note 18; Note, Radio and Television-Federal Communication Act-
Encoded Subscrnption Television Signals Find Protection Under Section 605 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 349 (1982). Contra Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Of-
fice, 474 F. Supp. 672, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (MDS transmissions fall within section 605's
exemption).
As the above cases indicate, Orth-O-Vision has been strongly questioned by both the
FCC and by every appellate court to consider the issue. See In re Regulation of Domestic
Receive-only satellite earth stations, 74 F.C.C.2d 204, 216 n.20 (1979) (Orth-O-Vision case
is not of decisional significance).
75. Those courts did not specifically discuss the conjunctive requirement of beneficial
use. See National Subscription Telev. v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1981);
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Tech., No. 81 Civ. 559, slip op. at 4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1981); American Telev. & Communication Corp. v. Pirate T.V., Inc.,
No. 81-969-CIV-EBD, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1981);supra note 67. Beneficial use
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IV. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 605 TO PIRATES
The applicability of section 605 to pirates, unlike vendors, is question-
able. 76 This is not evidenced, however, by either the district or Eighth
Circuit opinions in Heller. Both the trial and appellate courts merely
footnoted the defendant's admissions and, without applying the conjunc-
tive test, summarily held that section 605 had been violated. 77 After a
close look at the statute's conjunctive requirements, this Comment
reveals problems which militate against the Eighth Circuit's summary
extension of section 605's prohibitions to pirates.
A. Intercepting, Receiving, and Assisting in Receiving
The trial and appellate courts assumed that Heller's acts constituted
an interception within the meaning of section 605.78 The assumption is
questionable in light of the Supreme Court's definition of "interception"
under section 605. 79 In Goldman v. United States, 80 the Supreme Court
defined a section 605 interception as a seizure before the intended recep-
tion of a communication.81 The Supreme Court stated:
[Interception] indicates the taking or seizure by the way or before arri-
val at the destined place. It does not ordinarily connote the obtaining
of what is to be sent before, or at the moment it leaves the possession of
was clearly present because the vendors financially gained by selling the equipment. See
i'nfra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
76. Although pirates clearly receive radio transmissions, section 605 fails to define the
terms interception and beneficial use, which constitutes the applicable section half of sec-
tion 605's conjunctive requirement. See infta notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
While several commentators have noted the need for amendments to section 605,
none have sought statutory clarification of the above term. See generally FCC Public No-
tice, supra note 5, at 1; Note, Subscrizt'ion Television And Section 605 Of The Communications
Act-The Pathology Of An AntiquatedStatute, 12 GOLDEN GATE 1 (1982); Note, supra note 18.
77. Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 3, aft'd, 710 F.2d at 494; supra note 39.
78. Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 3 n.3, affd, 710 F.2d at 494 n.5. In a footnote, the
court observed that "[dlefendant admits that he has intercepted [MSI's] signals and received
HBO programming without paying the monthly subscription fee." See Heller, No. 3-82-
933, slip op. at 3 n.2 (emphasis added). Heller's admission, however, merely stated
"[d]efendant admits said antenna has received MSI's programming." Defendant's Answer
and Counterclaim at 2, Movie Sys. v. Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. (D. Minn. Oct. 20,
1982) (emphasis added).
79. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Past court decisions have broadly
construed the term "interception," declining to require a physical trespass. See Katz v.
United States, 389, U.S. 347 (1967); infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. No court,
however, has used this broad definition in the context of section 605. Moreover, the lan-
guage of section 605 still differentiates between a reception and an interception. See infra
note 67 (text of section 605). Contra 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510(4) (Law. Co-op. 1979) (wiretap-
ping statute) ("intercept means the aural acquisition of any wire or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device").
80. 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (use of detectaphone to eavesdrop on telephone conversation
not an interception within meaning of section 605).
81. Id at 134.
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the proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into the pos-
session of the intended receiver.
8 2
Applying this definition to pirates such as Heller, it is apparent that a
pirate receives a pay TV signal at the same moment as intended receiv-
ers. No seizure occurs before the programming's arrival at subscribers'
homes. Rather, the microwave signals emitted by MDS companies are
received simultaneously by all owning microwave equipment.
83
The Supreme Court later added the invasion of privacy to the defini-
tion of a section 605 interception. In Rathbun v. UnitedStates, 84 the Court
held that the mere unauthorized reception of a communication did not
constitute an interception when it was a risk within the contemplation of
the complaining party.8 5 It should follow, therefore, that a broadcast of
an unscrambled omnidirectional signal into the public domain does not
create a reasonable expectation of privacy. Such a broadcast is made
subject to the risk that pirates might receive the transmission.
Pirates also do not "assist others in receiving" within the meaning of
the statute.8 6 Pirates satisfy the statute's first requirement because their
monitoring involves the reception of unauthorized commmunications.
Nevertheless, "the mere monitoring of a radio transmission does not vio-
late section 605."87 Whether a pirate violates the statute hinges on the
presence of the second half of the conjunctive requirement.
B. Divulgence, Publicatizon, and Benefrial Use
In order to meet the second conjunctive requirement, a pirate such as
Heller must beneficially use an unauthorized communication. The alter-
native requirements of divulgence88 and publication 89 are rarely present
82. Id
83. See supra note 22. Although some pirates may receive a transmission slightly
before subscribers living farther from the local transmitter, this technical fact is probably
insufficient to constitute an interception. Such an analysis of interception would depend
on whether a subscriber or a pirate lived closer to the local transmitter and thus received
the signal first.
84. 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
85. Id. at 110-11; accord United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1973) (no
constitutional protection where speaker is cognizant of an eavesdropper).
86. See supra note 77.
87. Letter from FCC, 3700 (Apr. 22, 1981) (on file at the William Mitchell Law Re-
view office).
88. "Divulgence" within the meaning of section 605 requires the unauthorized disclo-
sure of a communication to third parties. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381-
82 (1937) (courtroom recitation of message constitutes divulgence); see also United States
v. Fuller, 202 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (disclosure by news agency of police radio
broadcasts subject to section 605).
In addition to divulgence, either a reception or interception is necessary to violate
section 605. Since a reception does not occur until the pirate perceives the communica-
tion, and since his friends and family also perceive the programming at the same time,
only reception occurs. Classifying this as both a reception and a divulgence lessens the
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because most pirates simply monitor unauthorized communications.
No court has ascertained the meaning of "beneficial use" within the
context of section 605. The district court's interpretation of secton 605 in
Heler avoided this issue by interpreting section 605 to provide that no
unauthorized person "shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or
foreign communication . ..for his own benefit or for the benefit of an-
other not entitled thereto." 90 By using the elipsis in this quotation, the
court omitted the second part of the statute's conjunctive test found in
the phrase "by radio and use such communication."91
In an unpublished private letter, the FCC has stated that beneficial
use includes the personal enjoyment of a communication. 92 A pirate's
unauthorized monitoring thus appears to violate section 605. The FCC's
statement, however, lacks support from other sources, and the FCC has
issued no regulations or public notices on section 605 which take that
position.
9 3
The legislative history9 4 of section 605 suggests that beneficial use re-
quires the act of using a communication for financial or commercial
threshold needed for a violation by eliminating one of the statute's necessary conjunctive
requirements. See infia note 93.
89. Although section 605's requirement of divulgence includes a disjunctive prohibi-
tion against publication, publication will not be discussed because pirates merely receive
transmissions and do not generally publish them to third parties.
90. He/er, No. 3-82-933, slip op. at 3.
91. The court's quote from the statute should have read "shall receive or assist in
receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such communication
for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto." See supra note 67
(text of section 605).
92. Letter from FCC, 3700 (Apr. 22, 1981) (on file at the William Mitchell Law Re-
view office).
93. In a Public Notice, the FCC stated:
Because material transmitted over stations is not intended to be 'broadcast' ma-
terial within the meaning of section 605, authority for its reception and use must
be given by the sender. Therefore, persons will be in violation of the law if they
divulge, publish or use for their own benefit any MDS communications which
they were not authorized to receive.
FCQ Public Notice, supra note 5, at 2 (emphasis added). This statement, however, merely
confirms the statute's conjunctive requirements of reception and beneficial use. While
personal enjoyment implicitly satisfies the requirement of reception, the FCC's notice does
not specifically state that personal enjoyment constitutes beneficial use.
The FCC's unofficial position, see supra text accompanying note 92, that personal
enjoyment is beneficial use has no legal support. Equating personal enjoyment with bene-
ficial use eliminates section 605's conjunctive requirement because reception and personal
enjoyment are indistinguishable. Both reception and personal enjoyment occur at the
same instant that a pirate first perceives pay TV programming.
The argument that reception and personal enjoyment constitute a violation of section
605 is also unsupported by the legislative history. When passing the Act, Congress con-
templated beneficial use as financial gain. See in.fra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
94. See generally 4 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 2373-546 (legislative history of the
1934 Act); Note, supra note 6, at 739-43 (discussion of legislative history).
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gain.95 At the time of enactment, radio was relatively new and was
available to all who could afford reception equipment. Although Con-
gress recognized the possible development of a pay TV industry,96 it did
not consider pay TV a viable enterprise.97 Thus, Congress never in-
tended that the personal enjoyment derived from reception of transmis-
sions would be a violation of section 605.98 Rather, Congress realized
that unauthorized reception of private radio communications was inevi-
table because of the limited number of broadcast frequencies and the
relatively easy access to radio receivers. As Senator Dill stated when in-
troducing the predecessor of the Act to the Senate: "First, and most im-
portant of all, radio in the United States is free. It is so free to the
listener-in that anybody anywhere may listen in to any broadcasting
whatsoever. "99
A determination that personal enjoyment meets the beneficial use re-
quirement of section 605 contradicts the legislative intent of the stat-
ute.tOO If the threshhold of the statute were lowered so that reception
and personal enjoyment constituted a violation of section 605, the effect
of the statute would be much broader than Congress intended.1 01 Such
an interpretation of section 605 would be unconstitutional as applied02
because it would subject persons to liability who lawfully receive unau-
thorized communications without using them beneficially. Moreover,
because the state could rarely establish probable cause against such per-
sons, it would be impossible to enforce section 605 without illegally
searching for or seizing evidence.103
MSI argued that Heller beneficially used its programming by not pay-
ing the monthly subscription fee.1o4 Although Heller avoided paying
MSI's nominal subscription fee by pirating, no beneficial use occurred
95. Congress sought to prohibit activities similar to those in Home Box Office, Inc. v.
Pay TV, 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). In Home Box Offlee, a pay TV company bene-
ficially used communications and violated section 605 by intercepting programming and
retransmitting it to paying subscribers.
96. 68 CONG. REC. 2577, 3033 (1927).
97. Id at 2880-81, 3033.
98. See supra note 93.
99. 67 CONG. REC. 12335 (1926).
100. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
101. Mere reception of any unauthorized communication would then constitute a vio-
lation of section 605. See generally supra note 93.
102. For example, this interpretation of section 605 would apply to persons who
merely receive police communications without divulging or using them for their benefit.
The mere reception of police and other citizen band radio transmissions is not illegal. See
United States v. Fuller, 202 F. Supp. 356, 358 (N.D. Cal. 1962) ("The main purpose of
Section 605 is to protect the means of communication, so that messages transmitted by
means of radio, or other forms of transmission, will be protected from interception and
divulgement by unauthorized persons." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
103. See infra notes 132-78 and accompanying text.
104. Appellee's Brief and Appendix, supra note 22, at 25.
1984]
15
et al.: Pay Television Piracy: Does Section 605 of the Federal Communicat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
because Heller was not using the signal for pecuniary gain. 105 The only
"beneficial use" was the personal enjoyment Heller received from watch-
ing the programming. Such personal enjoyment, however, is inherent in
the reception of any television programming and not a separate benefi-
cial use within the meaning of section 605.106 The plaintiffs argument
and the court's opinion are inaccurate because personal enjoyment can-
not satisfy the conjunctive requirement of section 605.
The Heller court's interpretation of section 605 is questionable because
courts should construe statutes only in a way that gives meaning to each
phrase, and does not render any phrase superfluous.107 A prohibition
against monitoring a transmission for one's personal enjoyment would
render superfluous the conjunctive requirement of beneficial use. If the
unauthorized personal enjoyment of radio transmissions was intended to
be illegal, the language of section 605 could be greatly simplified; the
statement "no person shall receive or aid in the reception of any unau-
thorized radio transmission" would suffice.
V. THE DEFENSE FOR PIRACY
Pirates argue that their activities should be allowed because "the air-
waves are free." Although the airwaves are part of the public domain,108
they are a limited resource whose use is validly regulated by the govern-
ment pursuant to the commerce clause. O9 The government's regulatory
licensing scheme traditionally has been justified by the fact that there are
more broadcasters than audio frequencies.11o Under the regulations, a
licensee has an exclusive right to transmit over a particular frequency,"'1
but ownership rights in that frequency are expressly denied't2 and the
granting of a license is conditional upon whether the public interest, con-
105. Although Heller was saving money by pirating, it was not the type of beneficial
use Congress intended to prohibit. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. Id
107. See, e.g., McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 266, reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 676
(1938); Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Wilderness Soc. v.
Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
108. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 173-74
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. See 47 U.S.C.S. § 151 (Law. Co-op. 1981); Note,Free Speech andthe Mass Media, 57
VA. L. REV. 636, 649 (1971).
110. See Note, supra note 109, at 648-49; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943). The Radio Act of 1927 was enacted in response to the confu-
sion generated by a dramatic increase in the number of broadcasters. Id.
111. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(h) (1976).
112. Title 47, section 301 of the United States Code provides that:
It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain control of the
United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission;
and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons
for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no
such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions,
and periods of the license.
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venience, and necessity would be served. 113
Because pay TV is in the public interest, and because piracy threatens
the economic existence of pay TV, those individuals who pirate pay TV
signals abuse their right to use the airwaves.' 14 A pirate's use is inimical
to both pay TV companies and paying subscribers who are deprived by
the diminished diversity and quality of pay TV programming.'15 Al-
though everyone has the right to use the public airwaves to some degree,
the adverse effect of pirates' actions exceeds this degree. The argument
that the "airwaves are free" alone is, therefore, not enough to justify
piracy.
Pirates have also argued that there is a first amendment right to use
antennae to receive programming.11 6 While using an antenna is not
speech," 7 the right to receive information is an adjunct within the scope
of the first amendment.ii 8 As an adjunct, however, the right to receive
information is incidental to the right to speak; the first amendment's pri-
mary focus is the speaker.'1 9
The first amendment "right" to pirate pay TV programming was ex-
amined recently in United States v. Stone. 120 In Stone, the defendants, who
were engaged in the business of advertising and selling microwave anten-
nae, down converters, and other equipment capable of receiving MDS
transmissions, were charged with violating section 605 for selling pirating
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (emphasis added); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 173-74 (airwaves are part of public domain).
113. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
114. Because airwaves are part of the public domain, the right to their use must be
balanced. Industry proponents argue that financial injuries caused by pirating mandate a
balancing that restricts the rights of pirates. Enforcement problems and the existence of a
less restrictive alternative, however, militate in favor of acquiescing to piracy.
115. Subscribers also have first amendment interests that demand consideration.
Should revenue losses from pirating bankrupt pay TV, subscribers would lose a significant
source of information. Those pay TV companies escaping bankruptcy could only provide
lower caliber, less diverse programming.
116. Heller, 710 F.2d at 495 n.8; United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. 234, 240 (S.D.
Tex. 1982).
117. Pirates might argue, however, that this constitutes symbolic speech. See Gabe,
Group to Aid Antenna Owner, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Aug. 22, 1982, at B1, col. 1. But see
United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. at 240 (actions of defendant pirates constituted
conduct).
118. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (first amendment includes
right of married persons to receive information); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143 (1943) (freedom of speech and press embraces the right to receive as well as distribute
literature); see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (protection of Bill of Rights goes beyond specific guarantees and includes the
right to receive communist publications).
119. See Comment, supra note 17, at 334; see also United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp.
at 240 (first amendment does not protect unauthorized interception by defendants of pri-
vate communications of adverse party).
120. 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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equipment to potential subscribers.' 2' The court held that the defend-
ants had no first amendment right to free MDS programming.122 Em-
phasizing the preferred status afforded speakers, the court stated that the
"communications defendants are alleged to have divulged did not origi-
nate with the defendants but were private communications among par-
ties other than the defendants."1 23 The court concluded that the actions
of the defendants constituted conduct rather than speech, noting that the
defendants had not alleged that there was any communicative element to
their conduct which brought the first amendment into play.'
24
Despite the holding in Stone, first amendment arguments will deserve
serious consideration in future suits against pirates.125 Unlike the de-
fendant electronic store in Stone, a pirate's argument that he has the right
to receive the increasingly diverse 2 6 information broadcast on pay and
free TV raises conduct with communicative elements sufficient to bring
the first amendment into play.' 27 Although it is a closer question
whether individuals have a first amendment right to pirated program-
ming, 128 catching offenders in the act would necessarily entail threaten-
121. Id at 236.
122. Id at 240.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Unlike Heller, defendants in other actions involving MSI will assert a first amend-
ment defense. See Dawson, supra note 51, at 12A, col. 2.
126. Pay TV fosters competition with free television, benefitting the public by increas-
ing the diversity and quality of television programming. See Fourth Report and Order, supra
note 17, at 517.
127. Pay TV subscribers have a first amendment right to receive programming be-
cause pay TV companies intend that their subscribers receive its programming. See Mar-
tin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) ("Freedom to distribute information
to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a
free society that. . . it must be fully preserved."); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
565 (1969) ("If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own home, what books he may read or what films he
may watch." (citation omitted)); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (protection of Bill of Rights goes beyond specific guarantees). A
subscriber's assertion that he has the right to this programming would thus certainly raise
communicative elements of conduct.
Although under a narrow view of the first amendment only the speaker's intent is
important, the intent of a pirate to hear information otherwise entitled to first amendment
protection would certainly reach the threshold necessary for his conduct to involve com-
municative elements. Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (in holding
that the act of burning draft card was not speech, the Supreme Court stated: "We cannot
accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech'
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
The intent of a "pirate" to receive pay TV programming is the same if not stronger
than the intent of a subscriber whose conduct does contain sufficient communicative
elements.
128. Under a broad interpretation of the first amendment, pirates have a right to re-
ceive programming. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61, 63, 68 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
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ing the rights of subscribers 129 and innocent citizens who have first
amendment rights to receive the programming.
30
Since the conduct of individual pirates and subscribers occurs within
the privacy of the home, the right of pirates and innocent citizens to
receive programming broadcast over pay TV "takes on an added dimen-
sion."131 Thus, although a first amendment claim by pirates, without
more, may not be a successful defense, such a claim, when balanced
against the problems of enforcement discussed below, supports the con-
clusion that section 605's application to pirates will raise constitutional
questions in future cases.
VI. ENFORCEMENT
A. Introduction
The most serious questions posed by the Eighth Circuit's application
of section 605 to individuals relate to enforcement problems. Although
facially valid, the court's interpretation of section 605 is in effect uncon-
stitutional because the means employed to detect microwave antennae
necessarily violate the fourth amendment and privacy rights of pirates as
well as innocent citizens.132 These enforcement problems arise both
when a pirate's microwave antenna is in plain view, and when it is
concealed. 133
Even when an antenna is in plain view, enforcement problems exist
because there are alternative legitimate uses for antennae 3 4 and practi-
cal problemsl3 5 which militate against finding sufficient probable cause
ing). Under this view of the first amendment, it is the communication, not the speaker's
intent, that is afforded protection. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). The right to listen without regard to
the speaker's intent facilitates a more uninhibited exchange in the marketplace of ideas.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
129. Subscribers as well as innocent citizens have a right to be free from electronic
surveillance amounting to an invasion of privacy. See indfa note 130.
130. Surveillance equipment can monitor the viewing preferences of both pirates and
innocent citizens, thereby threatening the privacy rights of non-pirates.
. 131. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564 (first amendment right to receive informa-
tion and ideas takes on an added dimension in the context of materials possessed in the
privacy of one's home).
132. See binfa notes 148-78 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
134. Legitimate alternative uses for pirating equipment include amateur television and
reception of educational television broadcasts. See Movie Sys. v. MWH Enter., No. 82-C-
0321, at 4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 1982) (order granting preliminary injunction); Movie Sys. v.
Communications Center, No. 4-82-661, slip op. at 4 (D. Minn. June 22, 1982) (order deny-
ing motion for contempt); American Telev. & Communication Corp. v. Pirate T.V., No.
81-969-CIV-EBD, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 1981); Tekkom, Inc. v. Dietrich, No. A-
202050, slip op. at 3 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark County June 2, 1981); see also supra note 72
(proviso excepting amateur radio broadcast receptions from section 605's application).
135. For example, homemade microwave antennae substitutes can receive signals and
1984)
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to issue a search warrant.136 The Heller decision is problematic because
the electronic search necessary to ascertain whether an antenna is receiv-
ing free MDS transmissions would constitute an illegal search and
seizure or an invasion of privacy.
137
Section 605 enforcement problems are magnified when the statute is
enforced against persons whose antennae are not in plain view. These
problems arise because antennae may be concealed 3a or placed inside
homes without significantly affecting reception.139 The effect of the Hel-
ler decision is to force pirates to conceal their antennae from public view.
Absent an informer's tip, the government could not establish the prob-
able cause needed for a warrant allowing electronic surveillance of con-
cealed antennae."40 Without probable cause, attempting to enforce
section 605 would necessarily entail the use of electronic equipmentl41 in
are difficult to detect even in plain view. One such device observed by the author was
constructed from an empty oil can. In addition, antennae atop nonsubscribers' homes do
not conclusively suggest pirating in localities serviced by more than one pay TV company.
136. Under the fourth amendment, "Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Issuing a warrant for an
electronic search raises interesting questions. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60
(1967). Unlike normal warrants, more than one search may be required, since it is diffi-
cult to predict when suspects may be watching television. Unless special provisions are
made (blanket or day-long warrants), a new warrant will be required after each unsuccess-
ful search. Observing the ramifications of government searches, the Berger court noted
that: "The proceeding by search warrant is a drastic one ... and must be carefully cir-
cumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life." Id at 58.
137. See infta notes 143-78 and accompanying text; cf Universal City Studios v. Sony
Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 446 (1979),modifed, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981),rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
774 (1984) ("Congress did not find that protection of copyright holders' rights over repro-
duction of their works was worth the privacy and enforcement problems which restraint of
home-use recording would create.").
138. See supra note 56.
139. Reception depends upon the number of obstructions between one's home and the
local transmitting point. The fewer the obstructions, the more leeway one has in antenna
placement. See Affidavit of Donald G. Krantz at 1, Appellee's Brief and Appendix at
A.76, Movie Sys. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983).
140. Absent any outward indicia of illegal activity, only informants or admissions
would sufficiently establish the requisite probable cause to issue a search warrant.
141. In Minneapolis, MSI conducted random electronic surveillance of entire neigh-
borhoods searching for pirates. See 'Prate' TV Antennas, supra note 28, at IA, col. 4. The
electronic surveillance equipment necessary to detect pirates is located inside mobile vans.
A main antenna mounted on the van is tuned to the desired frequency and picks up
signals emitted by a microwave antenna. Peaks on the screen of an oscilloscope inside the
van represent antennae behind chimneys and trees and even inside homes. By calibrating
the exact frequency of electronic "backwash" received from the antenna, it is possible to
prove an antenna is tuned to a certain frequency. Id. The possibility that the van is
picking up backwash from other antennae is eliminated by triangulating. After using a
VHF antenna to ascertain the VHF frequency of the television set, the two frequencies are
subtracted from each other and a determination is made whether the suspect antenna is
being used to pirate the MDS transmission. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 48, at 8.
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an indiscriminate illegal manner. 142 Specifically, monitoring the homes
and television viewing habits of both innocent and guilty parties would
constitute either an unreasonable search and seizure in the case of state
action, or an invasion of privacy when carried out by private parties such
as pay TV companies.
B Governmental Enforcement of Section 605
Katz v. United States 143 established the standard for determining
whether an unreasonable search and seizure has occurred within the
meaning of section 605.144 The protection provided by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments against unreasonable searches and seizures de-
pends upon the presence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.145
Under Katz, a reasonable expectation of privacy requires an actual sub-
jective expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable and objectively justifiable under the circumstances. 146 What
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy thus depends upon the
particular facts of each case, and "whether the area [involved] was one in
which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from government
intrusion."147 As the following analysis will show, both pirates and inno-
cent individuals who are monitored by electronic surveillance have the
requisite expectation of privacy necessary to merit both privacy and
fourth amendment protection.
L An Actual Subjective Expectation of Privacy
The fact that people watch television in their homes implies an actual
subjective expectation to keep private what they are viewing.148 At the
core of the fourth amendment is the right of a person "to retreat into his
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."149
The penumbra of this right arguably extends to the right to maintain the
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
143. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
144. Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
145. Id
146. Id For cases citing the Katz test, see United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081,
1085 (1983); United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 63
(1982); United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1973). See generall Case Note, No Fourth Amendment Impli-
cations Raised by the Monitoring of an Electronic Tracking Device Installed in a Car Travelling onto
Private Propertyfrom a Public Roadway, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 319 (1984).
147. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
148. See United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1980).
149. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (citing Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see, e.g., Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499
F. Supp. 223, 231 (E.D. Tex. 1980) ("What a person does in his own home... [is] pre-
sumptively protected from the prying eyes and ears of the state."); infla notes 153-55 and
accompanying text; see also 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
19841
21
et al.: Pay Television Piracy: Does Section 605 of the Federal Communicat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
privacy of communications received in the home. 150 Like all citizens, a
pirate has a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy when watching
television in his home.'
5
1
This expectation may not be compromised by private party or govern-
mental attempts to monitor the home. For example, a pirate does not
need to obstruct a potential telescopic viewing of his television screen or
antenna in order to maintain a reasonable subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. 152 As the Supreme Court has stated, "any enhanced viewing of the
interior of a home. . . impair[s] a legitimate expectation of privacy and
encounters the fourth amendment's warrant requirement .... "153
A pirate's reasonable expectation of privacy may also not be violated
through the use of electronic surveillance. In Heller, MSI allegedly con-
firmed the defendant was a pirate by using electronic surveillance to
monitor his "backwash." Backwash is an electronic signal given off by
oscillators in television sets and down converters. 54 Because the effect of
electronically detecting backwash is no different from telescopically view-
ing what one watches on television,55 both innocent viewers and pirates
have a reasonable expectation to keep their television viewing prefer-
ences private.
The district court's summary conclusion that Heller had no protectible
privacy interest in backwash emitted from an antenna in plain view156 is
questionable in light of the above analysis. Neither the backwash nor
what Heller was watching on television were in plain view.157 In addi-
tion, the presence of alternative uses for Heller's microwave dish158 mili-
tate against the district court's apparent reliance on the plain view
doctrine.
UNITED STATES §§ 1899-1900 (4th ed. Cambridge 1873) (1st ed. Cambridge 1833) (com-
mentary on fourth amendment).
150. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 n.1 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
151. Even in the sanctity of the home, a reasonable expectation of privacy would not
be present if one knowingly exposed to the public what one claimed to keep private. Katz,
389 U.S. at 357. It follows that unless a person publicly displays his antenna or promi-
nently places his television screen within public view, a reasonable subjective expectation
to keep private what one watches on television exists.
152. See United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 (1980); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, reh'g denied, 395 U.S. 931 (1969) (hotel room constitutes protected
area immune from surveillance by recording equipment).
153. Taborda, 635 F.2d at 139 (emphasis added).
154. See supra note 48.
155. In each instance, a person has both a subjective and objective reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy that no one is monitoring what they are watching on television. Further-
more, electronic equipment will soon be able to tape record a picture of pirated
programming. See 'Pirate' TVAntennar, supra note 28, at 5A, col. 3.
156. See supra note 48.
157. Cf Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 677 F.2d 471, 475-79 (5th Cir.
1982) (odors perceptible to trained police dogs not in plain view).
158. See supra note 61.
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2. A Reasonable and Objectively Justifiable Expectation of Privacy
The subjective expectation to keep private one's television viewing
preferences is one which society recognizes as reasonable and objectively
justifiable. Watching television involves the reception of communica-
tions within the privacy of the home, 59 an action protected by the first
amendment.160 Furthermore, a home is a person's castle,161 historically
viewed as immune from unwarranted searches and seizures.162
A comparison of the privacy expectations involved in a surveillance
also supports an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Televi-
sion viewers have a greater expectation of privacy than pay TV compa-
nies which broadcast unscrambled programming into the public
airwaves.163 When a pay TV company is aware that a significant
number of pirates exists,164 it is objectively unreasonable to expect that
only subscribers will receive their unscrambled signal. 165
Pirates have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they meet
both requirements of the Katz test. It may be objectively disturbing that
pirates receive free a service paid for by others. State acquiescence, how-
ever, extends to other similar "illegal" activities which occur within the
sanctity of the home.16 6 The Supreme Court has explained the rationale
behind this acquiescence by stating: "while the states retain the broad
power to regulate. . . that power simply does not extend to [regulating]
159. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
160. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
161. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973); J. STORY, supra note
149, §§ 1899-1900; cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
162. See infra notes 168-78.
163. Unscrambled signals are clearly more susceptible to pirating than scrambled sig-
nals. While technology can develop decoders capable of unscrambling transmissions, laws
prohibiting the unauthorized manufacture and distribution of reception equipment inevi-
tably will discourage pirating.
Pay TV companies are essentially taking a business risk by transmitting unscrambled
signals. To scramble their signal, a company must both purchase expensive scrambling
equipment and supply viewers with decoding devices. See Note, supra note 6, at 744 n. 178
(costs incurred by scrambling). Purchasing and servicing such equipment inevitably re-
sults in higher start-up and subscription rates to be borne by subscribers.
164. In He//er, MSI's predecessor both failed to service homeowners and tolerated pri-
vate installation of reception equipment. See supra note 15.
165. See Willamette Subscription Telev. v. Cawood, No. 83-1706 PA, slip op. at 11 (D.
Or. Feb. 14, 1984) (Although a pay TV company " 'expects' to protect itspropert' interests,
... that is not the same as having an expectation ofprivacy." (emphasis in original)). In
order to have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, pay TV companies would
have to scramble their signal in an effort to protect their rights. See supra note 163.
166. Piracy is considered illegal because it is against the public interest and threatens
the rights of both subscribers and pay TV companies. Similarly, private possession of
obscene materials in the home is considered illegal because it is the biggest market and
main incentive for pornography. The Supreme Court, however, declined to regulate the
private possession of obscene materials. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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the individual in the privacy of his own home."167 Because pirates have
a reasonable expectation of privacy, their activities may legitimately be
regulated only indirectly by methods which do not invade the privacy of
the home.
C Reasonableness of the Search and Seizure
Assuming a reasonable expectation of privacy, the next question
presented is whether electronic surveillance without a search warrant
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amend-
ment. Case law suggests that the use of electronic equipment to detect
pirates is unconstitutional under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Until 1967, the determination of whether electronic surveillance con-
stituted a search and seizure was based upon physical trespass. With
Katz v. United States, 168 the Supreme Court dispensed with the notion of
trespass, instead emphasizing one's reasonable expectation of privacy. In
light of recent technological developments, it is unnecessary to distin-
quish between electronic surveillance carried out by means of a physical
trespass and surveillance penetrating a private area without a technical
trespass.16 9 "The ingenious mind of man can conjure up subtle methods
of search through modern electronics as reprehensible as kicking down a
door. "170
Backwash is an intangible item protected under the fourth amend-
ment. Since Katz, the Supreme Court has held that intangible items are
subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment.' 7' Monitoring back-
wash is a violation of the fourth amendment because people have a rea-
sonable expectation to keep their backwash private. There is a subjective
expectation of privacy because backwash is imperceptible and emanates
from the privacy of the home.' 72 An objective expectation of privacy
167. Id at 568. First amendment considerations clearly militate against regulating the
distribution of pornographic materials. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973). Regulating the sale of pirating equipment is permissible, however, be-
cause the first amendment protects the right to receive programming. See supra note 127
and accompanying text.
168. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
169. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179-80 (1969); see also Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Silverman, Justice
Douglas stated:
The degree of its remoteness from the inside of the house - is not the measure of
the injury. There is in each such case a search that should be made, if at all, only
on a warrant issued by a magistrate. . . . But neither should the command of
the fourth amendment be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind of
electronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be whether the
privacy of the home was invaded.
Id
170. United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1973).
171. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (conversation may be seized within
meaning of fourth amendment).
172. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The very fact that a
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exists because the surveillance of backwash is in effect the surveillance of
what one watches on television.173 Therefore, a person has a reasonable
expectation to keep his television preferences private and need not shield
backwash from electronic surveillance. 174
In Heller, MSI took the position that no search occurred because its
electronic equipment could only sense the backwash emanating from
Heller's antenna. 17 5 It argued that the equipment merely received sig-
nals and did not beam radio waves through people's homes. 176 Although
the substance of this argument would have had merit under the physical
trespass analysis, it was invalidated by Katz and its progeny.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Heler is problematic because the elec-
tronic surveillance of backwash necessary to enforce section 605 consti-
tutes an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. 177 The court's implied authorization of "the indis-
criminate use of [electronic] devices in law enforcement raises grave con-
stitutional questions under the fourth [amendment]." ' 78
D. Private Enforcement of Section 605
Although section 605 is a criminal statute, private parties such as pay
TV companies can 179 and are perhaps more likely to attempt enforce-
ment of the statute than the government. 8 0 Even though the substance
and effect of private action is no less devastating than state action, the
courts have never subjected private actions to the restraints of the Consti-
tution.181 Nevertheless, enforcement problems will arise in future cases
person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he intends to have privacy.");
f Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974) (no unreason-
able search and seizure occurred when inspector performed warrantless test on smoke visi-
bly rising from chimney).
173. See 'Pirate' TVAntennas, supra note 28, at 5A, col. 3 (electronic equipment soon will
be able to tape record picture of pirated programming from television sets).
174. Cf United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980) (expectation of
privacy to be free from telescopic surveillance in one's home not affected by failure to close
curtains).
175. Appellee's Brief and Appendix, supra note 22, at 40.
176. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, at 10
n. 11, Movie Sys. v. Heller, No. 3-82-933, slip op. (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1982).
177. The Heller decision will be questioned in future cases because it impliedly autho-
rizes the private indiscriminate use of electronic devices by pay TV companies. Accord
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (New York statute authorizing the indiscrimi-
nate use of electronic surveillance devices held unconstitutional).
178. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966).
179. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
180. The situation is clearly more threatening to pay TV companies than to the gen-
eral public. Although the government has brought criminal actions under section 605, see,
e.g., United States v. Stone, 546 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1982), it is more likely that the
pay TV companies will be the concerned parties.
181. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); United States v. Wilkerson, 478 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1973); United
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because most states, unlike Minnesota, recognize a cause of action for the
invasion of privacy. 182
As of December 1983, two states have also expressed their concern over
electronic surveillance by enacting legislation prohibiting pay TV com-
panies from monitoring what individuals watch on television. A Wiscon-
sin statute, specifically geared toward cable television, acknowledges the
serious threat to privacy posed by technological advances in the pay TV
industry. 183 Under the statute, subscribers may ensure their privacy by
requiring a cable pay TV company to install a device which allows the
subscriber to prevent reception and transmission of messages by his
equipment.184 An Illinois statute prohibits pay TV companies from pos-
sessing or using electronic equipment capable of aurally or visually moni-
toring their subscribers. 185 The language of the statute is very broad and
impliedly prohibits pay TV companies from monitoring what pirates
watch on pay TV. 186 Because of these statutes and the right to sue pri-
vate parties for the invasion of privacy, pay TV companies must be cau-
tious when seeking to enforce section 605 by a civil action in other states.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Hd/er decision is not the last word on piracy. The protection it
affords pay TV companies is limited. First, the state will be unable to
constitutionally enforce section 605 because pirates will conceal their an-
tennae. Second, the probability of valid counterclaims and the time and
expense of litigation will discourage pay TV companies from initiating
civil actions under section 605. Further judicial or congressional action is
necessary to adequately protect the pay TV industry.
In Heller, the Eighth Circuit strained the language and intent of sec-
tion 605 in an attempt to solve the problems facing the pay TV industry.
In doing so, the court has reached the limits of its power. It is now time
for Congress to act because it can best balance the competing interests
implicated by pay TV piracy. As the Supreme Court recently stated, "In
States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Burton, 475 F.2d 469 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835 (1973). But see United States v. Roberts, 644 F.2d 683, 686-
88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980) (closer adherence to fourth amendment re-
quirements necessary where first amendment materials are involved); United States v.
Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1378 (8th Cir. 1976) (private searches supervised by government
officials constitute government searches subject to constraints of fourth amendment).
182. See Note, supra note 48, at 175. The Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to recog-
nize the tort for invasion of privacy. See Hendry v. Connor, 303 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d
921 (1975) (per curiam) (unnecessary for disposition of this case to decide whether a cause
of action for invasion of privacy should be recognized in Minnesota).
183. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.43 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
184. See id § 134.43(1)(a).
185. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 87-3(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
186. The statute prohibits pay TV companies from utilizing equipment capable of
electronically monitoring the viewing preferences of their subscribers. Id
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a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course,
[the Court] must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created
by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of
interests." 187
Amending section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 is not the
best solution. The constitutional problems encountered upon enforce-
ment would still be present. Moreover, there is the likelihood of more
states providing their citizens a statutory or common law cause of action
against pay TV companies that conduct electronic surveillance.
The best solution is for Congress first to regulate strictly the manufac-
ture and sale of pirating equipment.188 As with pornography and home
video-taping, it is impossible to enforce constitutionally a law against
piracy which occurs in the privacy of the home. Second, to thwart pi-
rates, Congress should also require that all pay TV companies scramble
their signals. Fewer pirates would then be able to obtain the equipment
necessary to unscramble MDS programming. Pirates who are able to
buy covertly or build decoders cannot legitimately be enjoined because
governmental or private party enforcement would infringe upon the
rights of countless citizens. If these pirates cause the pay TV industry
economic harm, such losses should be looked upon merely as a risk of
using the public airwaves to conduct a for-profit business.
187. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 783 (1984).
188. California adopted legislation in 1980 which forbids the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of any devices capable of receiving over-the-air and cable TV transmissions.
California Penal Code section 593e states:
Every person who for profit knowingly and willfully manufactures, distributes,
or sells any device or plan or kit for a device, or printed circuit containing cir-
cuitry for interception or decoding with the purpose or intention of facilitating
interception or decoding of any over-the-air transmission by a subscription tele-
vision service made pursuant to authority granted by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission which is not authorized by the subscription television service is
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2500) or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 90
days, or both.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1984).
Enactment of section 593e generated substantial controversy. See Comment, Television
Decoders, supra note 5, at 846-49. The criticism focuses on the poor wording of the statute,
and its effect as a prior restraint on the freedom of the press. Id at 847-48. Because of
these problems, one commentator recommends that the FCC, not the individual states,
should resolve the problems of piracy. Id at 870.
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